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Analyses of the inter-relationships between public enterprises and 
the central government are usually based on a continuum from the 
"departamental agency", with little autonomy, at one end, to the "business 
enterprise", with a high degree of autonomy, at the other. The public 
corporation is usually placed midway. 
However, the present document does not use this approach; instead 
it explores the informal arrangements whereby a public enterprise^ 
effective freedom of action becomes the result of a complex system of 
objectives, controls, incentives and penalties» Autonomy is thus perceived 
as the end product of a series of inter-relationships - both formal and 
informal - between public enterprises and the central government, with 
special attention paid to the deficiencies in such inter-relationships 
that impair the performance of enterprises. 
The central government is here defined as a central guiding nucleus 
or group of inter-related agencies. 
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The fornmlation and implementation of government objectives are 
hindered by conflicts among agencies, that is, conflicts in the government 
itself, or between the government and outside elements. 
The components of the central guiding nucleus considered in this 
paper are the following: sectoral ministries; national budget bureaux; 
administrative reform agencies and the Office of the President. Each 
component has its own sphere of interests which may clash with those of 
others. There are also institutional factors and other variables which 
can give rise to diafunctional sub~objectives for the system as a whole. 
The main problem is the translation of the central nucleus* interest 
in influencing certain actions of the enterprise into specific objectives, 
expressed in sufficiently explicit terms. The objectives of the central 
guiding nucleus may conflict with other objectives, and the enterprise 
may be forced to conform to policies and regulations that are inconsistent 
with the goal of achieving a satisfactory economic performance. Short-
tern problems and activities often tend to displace long-term problems 
and activities. 
Inter-relationships between the central government and public 
enterprises are summarized in the table that follows. 
In addition to the implicit or explicit objectives of the central 
guiding nucleus regarding the behaviour of public enterprises, the 
regulatory mechanisms - explicit or implicit, formal or informal - used 
by the components of the central guiding nucleus to influence the behaviour 
of enterprises are examined. 
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.g 
Component units of the 
eentrai guiding nuoleus Kaln responsibilities 
Causes of funetlcnel 
distortions 




Sectoral ministries Ha.-acniza"tion of 
enterprises and 
sectoral policies 
«Weakness or Insistence 
Of sectoral planning 
agencies 
•» Consequently, lack of 
sectoral polio; 
- lasuffloi ent power of 
analysis at the 
ministerial level 
- Over-riding interest in 
short-term affairs 
- Analyses carried out 
intermittently and 
rltuallstloally 
~ Esplloit objectives la 
very broad terms 
«• Objectives relating to 
fujiotional distortions 
generally remain implicit 
National budget bureau Co-ordination of the 
programmes for large 
unltsj by using the 
budget as a planning 
Instrument 
- Substitution of ends 
by means 
- Negative Image of -the 
public enterprise 
- Esoesslvoiy detailed 
discussion of public 
enterpri s es * exp endltur e 
particularly whea run at 
a loss 
- Cono em over curtailing 
expenses over the short 
term 
- Iapllclt 






techniques of tile 
planning process 
» Analysis bears mostly on 
public enterprise 
investment 
- Greater attention paid to 




- Generally ezplloit 




with the government*8 
economic policies 
Pressure exerted by 
short-term problems 
Variable aoocrding to 
the nature sf short-term 
problems 
- Generally explicit 
Administrative reform 
agencies 
Transformation of the 




- finphasis on structural 
and formal aspeots 
- Bcoesslve powers of 
conditioning attributed 
to formal Organization 
- Very broad objectives 
are made explicit 
- Strategies and objectives 











The following chart shows the enterprises' decision-making process 
and the possibilities of influsncing it. 
Criteria for choosing 
alternatives 
Enterprises' 
de ci sion-making 
process 
Environment 
Factor prices Product prices 








Direct regulatory measures are based on the power relationship 
between the central guiding nucleus and enterprises, and are usually 
expressed in terms of orders and instructions,. Acceptance of and 
compliance with such instructions will depend on the relative power of 
the imparting authorities, that is, on the probability of their being 
obeyed, which can in no case be equal to unity, since there will always 
be some divergence between the aim of such instructions and what is 
obtained in fact. 
The extent of the divergence will depend on several factors, 
inter alia? (a) the possibility of complying and the clearness with which 
such orders or instructions are issuedj (b) the degree of consistency 
between such instructions and the preferences of those receiving them; 
(c) the incentives and penalties, whether tangible or intangible attached 
to compliance, and (d) the efficiency of the compliance control system.. 
Although the administrative cost of indirect regulatory measures 
is very low, they are little used in Latin America, mainly because they 
are closely connected with all the remaining elements of the decision-
making process. Thus for example, a rise in the rate of exchange will 
lead to a saving in the use of foreign exchange if the enterprise is 
trying to maximize profits. However, if the purpose of those controlling 




enterprise is trying to minimize technical problems in a production 
process, the measure adopted may have no influence whatsoever on the use 
of foreign exchange. 
In addition, although the use of indirect mechanisms has a low cost, 
the processes of preparation and calculation are very difficult. Thus, 
there is no great problem in making up the deficit of a railway from 
budgetary resources, but it is a complex matter indeed to conceive a 
differential subsidy scheme. 
Finally, mention is made of the fact that those in power tend to 
mistrust indirect measures, the use of influence, incentives, etc. This 
basic attitude and the consequent tendency to use imperative forms of 
action are not only some of the main underlying problems in the inter-
relationship between the public enterprise and the central government, 
but also give rise to some of the major criticisms levelled at the 
administrative reform strategies applied in some Latin American countries. 
The relationship between the public enterprise and the central 
guiding nucleus has such a variety of forms that .it is impossible to 
analyse in general terms what influence such problems have on the 
performance of enterprises. However, in this variety a continuum can be 
observed, at one end of which are the enterprises subjected to the 
numerous conflicting pressures exerted by the various components of the 
central guiding nucleus, to many regulatory measures which have a paralysing 
effect and to ambiguous power relationships» At the other extreme are 
the enterprises which maintain univocal power relationships with some 
components of the nucleus, generally the Office of the President, relations 
which are similar to those of a feudal lord with a king. 
Most Latin American public enterprises tend to one of these extremes. 
The ideal solution would be a system in which the central guiding nucleus 
could use the public enterprise as a keystone in the development process 
without impairing its internal efficiency. 
The strategies suggested to this end tend to be ineffectual because 
they are not comprehensive enough. A great deal of the literature on this 
subject points out that inefficiency is due to structural and organizational 
defects. Stress is laid on the need for public enterprises to use modern 
/methods, such 
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methods, such as cost accounting, for the establishment of efficiency 
bureaux, for better sales and personnel policies, for more efficient 
operation of internal reporting and control systems and for less 
concentration of decision-making at the higher levels. However, when 
such decisions are adopted in an isolated manner and are imposed from 
above, the desired effect vanishes as soon as the motive force disappears, 
since efforts are concentrated on consequences rather than on causes, and 
due account is not taken of problems arising from the basic attitudes 
of those participating in the process. Another theory that is often put 
forward is that the whole problem boils down to placing outstanding mtn 
in the key posts. Those who advocate this solution forget that, in order 
to be feasible, a strategy for change should be based on average men and 
attitudes. The qualifications of leaders are always relative, although 
there is no doubt that good progress could be made if flagrant cases of 
miscasting, as are sometimes to be observed in the region, could be 
corrected. 
The improvement of inter-relationships between public en-'isrprises 
and central government should be effected on the following four fronts« 
(a) Centralization. Disgregation and lack of co-ordination in 
the action of or influence exerted by the components of the central 
guiding nucleus have a negative impact on the public enterprise. The 
relative success of some holding companies can be attributed to the fact 
that the relationships with the subsidiary enterprises are clear-cut, 
stable and functional. Although this type of solution is not always 
suitable in the conditions to be found in Latin American countries, it 
might be useful in certain cases, particularly for industrial enterprises. 
As a general measure the planning and research capacity of sectoral 
ministries should be reinforced and relations with the rest of the 
government should be chanelled through them,. 
(b) Clear and consistent definition of objectives. Centralization 
of relationships between the enterprise and the rest of the government 
does not mean that the remaining components of the central guiding nucleus 
will have no influence in determining the objectives of the public 
enterprise, but that a degree of harmony will be reached in an agency 
/which can 
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which can understand the problems and aims both of the enterprise and of 
the other government agencies* "When objectives are thus made consistent 
they should be transmitted to the enterprise as clearly as possible. 
(c) Change in the type of regulatory measures. The most common 
kind of regulatory action imposes a certain type of behaviour on the 
enterprise without considering over-all effects. The number and salaries 
of staff are restricted; rigid manning tables are imposed; and inflexible 
regulations are applied for recruitment, promotion and dismissal. The 
enterprise must often operate with an itemized budget. Preventing dishonesty 
rather than securing efficiency is the watchword for purchasing procedures. 
The enterprise's borrowing capacity is limited to such an extent that some 
do not use the banking system even to cover transitory or seasonal cash 
requirements. Such regulatory measures should be used only exceptionally 
and for short periods, 
(d) Changes in the system of incentives and penalties. Preference 
should be given to incentives no matter how difficult they may be to apply. 
Penalties, particularly removal of executives, should be applied sparingly 
and always on dear and objective grounds. 
The main problem facing the central government with respect to the 
execution of its plans is that of creating the conditions which will allow 
for, and stimulate, change, and for this purpose the existence of adequate 
inter-relationships is indispensable. 
The first task is to reinforce sectoral ministries by creating strong 
planning and research teams in them. This measure has the added advantage 
of reinforcing the general planning system in an aspect which has 
frequently been neglected. 
At the same time the network of regulations which hampers the 
activities of enterprises should be almost completely abolished, without 
excepting enterprises in chronic deficit, which are most in need of 
freedom of action. 
Finally, the central government should pay particular attention to 
the selection of adequate executives for public enterprises, since they 
will be responsible for all changes. 
These are not easy solutions, but in the measure that planning teams 
are formed and qualified executives appointed a step forward will have been 
taken in the process of attaining an efficient public sector. 

